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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE ROAD COMMISSION
OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, a corporation; MOUNTAIN
FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY, a
corporation; and THE MOUNTAIN
STATES TELEPHONE AND
TELEGRAPH COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case
No. 9163

BRIEF OF RESPONDEN.TS
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts contained in Appellant's
Brief is correct. However, Respondents wish to amplify
the Statement of Facts in the following respects.
The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 provides that
on the National System of Interstate and Defense High1
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ways the Federal government will reimburse the state
for 90% of the cost of construction and such additional
percentage of the remaining 10% of such cost in any
state containing unappropriated and unreserved public
lands and non-taxable Indian lands, exceeding 5% of the
total area of all lands therein, equal to the percentage
that the area of such lands in such State is of its total
area.
Chapter 53, Laws of Utah, 1957, Section 27-2-7 (22),
UCA 1953, provides not only that the appellant will pay
the costs incurred by a utility incident to relocating its
facilities when the same becomes necessary by reason
of Federal-Aid highway construction, but also provides
that such payment shall be limited to those cases where
"proportionate reimbursement of such cost may be
obtained by the State of Utah from the Unitea States
pursuant to the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956."
This statute further provides that the term "cost of
relocation" shall include "the entire amount paid by such
utility properly attributable to such relocation after deducting therefrom any increase in the value of the new
facility and any salvage value derived from the old
facility."
POINT

I.

SECTION 27-2-7(22), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER
53, LAWS OF UTAH 1957, WAS INTENDED
TO REIMBURSE PUBLICLY, PRIVATELY
AND COOPERATIVELY OWNED UTILITIES,
INCLUDING DRAINAGE AND IRRIGATION
SYSTEMS AND UTILITIES OWNED BY ALL
POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS FOR THE COST
OF RELOCATING THEIR FACILITIES ON
2
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FEDERAL-AID HIGHWAY PROJECTS AND
TO ALLOW THE STATE OF UTAH TO ACCEPT FEDERAL AID AVAILABLE FOR
SUCH PURPOSES.
II.
REIMBURSEMENT BY THE STATE TO PUBLICLY, PRIVATELY AND COOPERATIVEL.Y
OWNED UTILITIES, INCLUDING DRAINAGE AND IRRIGATION SYSTEMS AND
UTILITIES OWNED BY ALL POLITICAL
SUBDIVISIONS FOR RELOCATION OF FACILITIES AS AUTHORIZED BY CHAPTER
53, LAWS OF UTAH 1957, IS A CONSTITUTIONAL EXERCISE OF THE POLICE
POWER BY THE STATE OF UTAH.
POINT

III.
REIMBURSEMENT BY THE STATE TO PUBLICLY, PRIVAVTELY AND COOPERATIVELY OWNED UTILITIES, INCLUDING
DRAINAGE AND IRRIGATION SYSTEMS
AND UTILITIES OWNED BY ALL POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS, FOR RELOCATION OF
FACILITIES AS AUTHORIZED BY CHAPTER
53, LAWS OF UTAH 1957, DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A LENDING OF THE CREDIT OF
THE STATE IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE
VI, SECTION 31 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
UTAH.
POINT

IV.
REIMBURSEMENT BY THE STATE TO PUBLICLY, PRIVATELY AND COOPERATIVELY
OWNED UTILITIES, INCLUDING DRAINAGE AND IRRIGATION SYSTEMS AND
UTILITIES OWNED BY ALL POLITICAL
SUBDIVISIONS FOR RELOCATION OF FACILITIES AS AUTHORIZED BY CHAPTER
POINT

3
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53, LAWS OF UTAH 1957, DOES NOT RELEASE OR EXTINGUISH AN INDEBTEDNESS, LIABILITY OR OBLIGATION IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 27 OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.
ARGUMENT

I.
SECTION 27-2-7 (22), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER
53, LAWS OF UTAH 1957, WAS INTENDED
TO REIMBURSE PUBLICLY, PRIVATELY
AND COOPERATIVELY OWNED UTILITIES,
INCLUDING DRAINAGE AND IRRIGATION
SYSTEMS AND UTILITIES OWNED BY ALL
POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS FOR THE COST
OF RELOCATING THEIR FACILITIES ON
FEDERAL-AID HIGHWAY PROJECTS AND
TO ALLOW THE STATE OF UTAH TO ACCEPT FEDERAL AID AVAILABLE FOR
SUCH PURPOSES.
Under the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956,
23 U.S.C.A., § 101, et seq., the scope and nature of the
Federal-Aid highway program was drastically changed.
"A crash program of unprecedented scale was inaugurated." S. Rep. No. 1407, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 53.
Recognizing the impact which the greatly expanded
highway program was having upon utilities and the fact
that neither the utilities nor their subscribers, as such,
were receiving any benefit therefrom, the Congress over
seven years ago began a series of hearings on the problem with the result that in the Feedral-Aid Highway Act
of 1956 there was included an express provision that,
when permitted under state law, utility relocation costs
are allowable as a part of the cost of the highway project
and federal funds may be used to reimburse the states for
4
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the payment of those costs in the same proportion as federal funds are expended on the rest of the project.
This provision is found at 23 U.S.C.A., § 123, and
provides that :
"When a State shall pay for the cost of relocation of utility facilities necessitated by the construction of a project on the Federal-Aid primary
or secondary systems or on the Interstate System, including extensions thereof within urban
areas, Federal funds may be used to reimburse
the State for such cost in the same proportion as
Federal funds are expended on the project. Federal funds shall not be used to reimburse the State
under this section when the payment to the utility
violates the law of the State or violates a legal
contract between the utility and the State.... "
In order to qualify for federal participation, the
Federal Bureau of Public Roads requires that "the State
certifies that payment for the utility relocation is not
in violation of the laws of the State or any legal contract
between the utility and the State. If there should be any
question as to the State's authority to pay for such relocation, the State may be required to cite or establish its
authority to pay for such relocation." U. S. Department
of Commerce, Bureau of Public Roads, Policy and Procedure Memorandum 30-4, Sec. 3 (2).
At common law, the courts have held that the utility's easement in the highway, like all property rights,
is always subject to the reasonable exercise of the state's
police power, and that therefore utilities can be required
to relocate at their own expense, any facilities located
within the right of way of a public highway whenever
the necessities of highway improvement require.
5
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Whether, even absent statutory modification, this
common law rule would apply to relocations necessitated
by projects on the Federal-Aid system is not entirely
free from doubt. In view of the magnitude of these projects and the enormous expense involved, cases dealing
with the local type of relocation known to the common
law do not necessarily furnish support for the proposition that requiring utilities to relocate at their own
expense on the Interstate, Primary or Secondary Systems would be a reasonable exercise of the police power.
In order to remove any doubt and fully meet federal
requirements, the legislatures of sixteen states, including
Utah, have since 1956 enacted statutes expressly making
the old common law rule inapplicable to the Federal-Aid
highway system and providing for payment of relocation
expenses by the state.
The legislative history of the Federal-Aid Highway
Act of 1956 establishes that it was intended to authorize
the federal government to participate in the cost of relocating utilities' facilities necessitated by highway construction whenever a state allows and pays such cost
to the utility. The Report of the Conference of the House
and Senate verifies this fact and recognizes the equity
of reimbursing utilities. In Conference Report No. 2436,
the conferees said :
" ... the Bill as passed by the House and recommended and accepted by the conferees recognizes
the equity of reimbursing utilities for the cost
of relocating facilities when required for FederalAid highway projects. Further, this Section
makes it clear that it is the intention of the federal
government to assume its proportionate share of
utility relocation cost whenever a state allows
such costs." United States Code Congressional
6·
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and Administrative News, Vol. II, 84th Cong., 2d
Sess. 2899 ( 1956) .
Chapter 53, Laws of Utah, 1957 (sometimes hereinafter referred to as the "Relocation Law") and similar statutes were expected by Congress, as shown by the
following statement made by Congressman McGregor of
Ohio, in speaking on the Conference Report on the Federal-Aid Highway Bill (102 Cong. Rec. 9930, June 26,
1956) :
" ... Under the existing practice, Mr. Speaker,
of the Bureau of Public Roads, federal funds
may participate in utility relocation costs to the
same extent as other construction costs without
percentage limitations based on the state's apportionment. This legislation encourages the states
to review their contemporary status and take objective action in accordance with such review."
(Emphasis added)
The Legislature of Utah reviewed its "contemporary status" and took "objective action in accordance
with such review" by passing Chapter 53, Laws of Utah
1957, 27-2-7 (22) UCA, 1953.
II.
REIMBURSEMENT BY THE STATE TO PUBLICLY, PRIVATELY AND COOPERATIVELY
OWNED UTILITIES, INCLUDING DRAINAGE AND IRRIGATION SYSTEMS AND
UTILITIES OWNED BY ALL POLITICAL
SUBDIVISIONS FOR RELOCATION OF FACILITIES AS AUTHORIZED BY CHAPTER
53, LAWS OF UTAH 1957, IS A CONSTITUTIONAL EXERCISE OF THE POLICE
POWER BY THE STATE OF UTAH.
7
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Before taking up in detail the Appellant's specific
attacks on the constitutionality of Chapter 53, we wish
to point out that the cardinal factor in this case, which
must be kept in mind in deciding the constitutional
question, is that the Relocation Law was adopted in the
exercise of the State's police power vested in the Legislature. It is universally recognized that the control of
highways is a proper subject for the exercise of the police
power and that this includes the regulation of the location and relocation of utility facilities on the highways.
Thus, in Owensboro v. Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Co., 230 U.S. 58, 72, the Supreme Court held that
a reservation in an ordinance, granting to a telephone
company an easement to occupy the streets, of the power
to amend the ordinance as the necessities of the city may
demand was
". . . no more than a reservation of the police
control of the streets and of the mode and manner
of placing and maintaining the poles and wires
incident to the unabridgeable police power of the
city."
In Minneapolis Gas Co. v. Zimmerman, 91 N.W. 2d
642, the Supreme Court of Minnesota said (at p. 656) :
" ... The relocation, construction, or reconstruction of highways clearly relates to the safety,
security, and general welfare of the citizens of
the state, and all steps taken in furtherance of
these objects-inclusive of the relocation of utility
facilities upon rights-of-way-are matters within
the police power of the state."
Furthermore, it appears on the face of the statute
that the exercise of the police power here involved has
8
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taken the form of substantive legislation. Section 27-2-7,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, deals with the duties and
powers of the State Road Commission. Subsection 22 of
Section 27-2-7 confers upon the Commission the power,
inter alia, to make reasonable regulations for the relocation of utility facilities on Federal-Aid highways
projects. It provides that the Commission may order such
relocation, but expressly provides for the payment of
cost of relocation as defined in the Act.
The question before this Court thus concerns the
validity of provisions of the substantive law, enacted by
the Legislature in the exercise of the police power of the
State. Its effect is clearly limited to relocations ordered
by the Commission after the effective date of the Act.
It does not purport to release any obligations which utilities may have had in connection with past relocations of
facilities.
It follows that the only questions involved in this
case are whether Chapter 53 constitutes a reasonable
exercise of the police power and is constitutional.
It is elementary that the Legislature has the power
to fix the public policy of the state and that it possesses
a wide range of discretion in the exercise of that power.
It it equally well settled that the Legislature has control
over public roads and highways in this state.
In the instant statute, the Legislature has declared
the public policy of the state by changing, for the future,
the rule of law governing liability for the expense of
relocating utility facilities necessitated by Federal-Aid
highway construction.
9
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Every exercise by the Legislature of its power to
establish the public policy and law of the state necessarily changes the pre-existing law and the rights and
obligations arising thereunder. That is the very essence
of the legislative power. Appellant's position is that
because prior to the enactment of Chapter 53, public
utilities had the common law duty to relocate their facilities at their own expense, the Legislature is powerless
to change this rule of law for the future. Acceptance
of this argument would, in effect, drastically curtail the
power of the Legislature to legislate, and all rights and
obligations existing under public law would remain
permanently frozen in their present form. The Constitution does not compel so absurd a conclusion. On the contrary, it is well established that the police power, i.e.,
the power to make new laws and change or abolish old
rules of law, can never be abdicated or bargained away,
and is inalienable even by express grant.
While the exercise of the police power, like all legislative action, must be reasonable, there is a very strong
presumption in favor of its constitutionality. Under
familiar principles of law, a statute must be sustained
unless its invalidity is apparent beyond a reasonable
doubt. Where there exists any doubt as to the validity
of a statute, the legislative action must be upheld and a
decision of the Legislature accepted by the judicial
department.
This presumption of constitutionality of the Legislature's exercise of the police power is so well established
in Utah and in all other jurisdictions generally that no
citations of authority are necessary. Consequently,
Chapter 53 must be upheld unless it is without rational
basis. Every doubt must be resolved in favor of its

10
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constitutionality . . . in no doubtful case will the judiciary pronounce a legislative act to be contrary to the
Constitution; to doubt the constitutionality of a law is
to resolve the doubt in favor of its validity. 11 Am. Jur.,
Constitutional Law, § 92.
". . . the rule is fixed that a party who alleges
the unconstitutionality of a statute normally has
the burden of substantiating his claim and must
overcome the strong presumption in favor of its
validity. It has been said that the party who
wishes to pronounce a law unconstitutional takes
on himself the burden of proving this conclusion
beyond all doubt, and that a party who asserts
that the legislature ... has violated the Constitution must affirmatively and clearly establish his
position. . . . It is insufficient merely to raise a
doubt or show that the legislation is unwise."
11 Am. Jur., Constitutional Law, § 132 and cases
cited there.
Reimbursement of utilities for relocation expenses
in connection with complex and costly highway projects
antedates the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 which
first officially sanctioned Federal participation in the
reimbursement of such costs. Thus, for many years,
statutes in California (Deering's California Codes, 1952,
"Streets and Highways," §§ 700, et seq.) , Connecticut
(Gen. Stats., 1949 Revision, Cum. Supp. 1953, Ch. 107,
§ 971 (c)), and New Jersey (Stats. Ann. 1940 Cum.
Supp. 1953, § 27:7 A-7) have provided for payment by
the state of relocation costs on express ways. The constitutionality of reimbursement under these statutes has
apparently never been doubted. In addition, with one
exception, all turnpike statutes expressly provide for
reimbursement of utility relocation costs.
11

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Alabama Code 1940 (1955 Supp.), Tit. 23, Sec.
124(16)e;
California Streets and Highways Code, Sec. 703;
Connecticut Public Acts of 1957, Ch. 576;
Florida Statutes 1957, Ch. 340, Sec. 340.07 (5) ;
Illinois Smith-Hurd Stat. Anno. (1957 Supp.), Ch.
121; Sec. 314a 34;
Indiana Statutes ( 1957 Supp.), Sec. 36-3206;
Kansas General Statutes ( 1957 Supp.), Ch. 68, Sec.
68-2005;
Kentucky Rev. Stat., Sec. 177.430 ( 5) and Laws
1954, S.B. 137, Sec. 15;
Louisiana Rev. Stat. ( 1957 Supp.), Tit. 48, Sec.
1256;
Maryland Anno. Code, Art. 89B, Sec. 145;
Michigan ·stat•. Anno. (1957-Supp.), Tit. 9, Sec.
9.1095(5);
New Jersey Stat. Anno., Tit. 27, Sec. 12B-6;
New York Highway Law, Sec. 346;
North Carolina General Stat., Ch. 136, Sec.
136-89.18;
Ohio Page's Rev. Code Anno., Ch. 5537, Sec. 5537.05;
Oklahoma Stat. ( 1957 Supp.) , Tit. 69, Sec. 674;
Rhode Island General Laws 1956, Ch. 12, Sees.
24-12-9 (q) ;
Texas Vernon's Civil Stat. (1957 Supp.), Art.
6674v, Sec. 6;
Vermont Laws1955, No. 270, H. B. 414, Sec. 4;
Virginia Code of 1950, Tit. 33, Sec. 33-255.6;
Wisconsin Stat. 1957, Sec. 59.965 (5) (h) 3.

12
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Thus, when Congress recognized the equity of reimbursing utilities for the cost of relocating facilities when
required for Federal-Aid highway projects, there was
not even a suggestion that any constitutional question
might be involved. Indeed, Conference Report No. 2436,
84th Cong., 2d Sess. makes it clear that the Congress did
not make a new departure, but merely affirmed the long
established practice of the Bureau of Roads in reimbursing states which paid utility relocation expenses on
Federal-Aid highways.
By the same token, when 16 states adopted reimbursement provisions designed to cooperate with the
Federal government in expediting the National System
of Interstate and Defense Highways without imposing
inequitable and in some instances unbearable burdens
on utility users, they were merely following an established public policy applicable to complex and costly
limited access highway projects, the propriety of which
had never been successfully challenged. In an exhaustive
study published by the National Academy of SciencesHighway Research Board in 1955 as Special Report 21,
entitled "Relocation of Public Utilities Due to Highway
Improvement-An Analysis of Legal Aspects," the Board
not only failed even to suggest that a constitutional question might be involved, but unequivocally stated on page
40 that the common law doctrine, under which utilities
had to relocate at their own expense, specifically admits
of legislative change.
It follows that at the time of the enactment of Chapter 53 and similar statutes, their propriety seemed established beyond question. It is not surprising, therefore,
that when shortly after the passage of the Federal-Aid

13
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Highway Act of 1956 the Legislatures of Maine and New
Hampshire requested advisory opinions from their respective Supreme Courts, the Justices had not the slightest difficulty in advising that the State could validly reimburse utili ties for relocation expenses.
Following the Maine and New Hampshire opinions,
the constitutionality of such statutes was nevertheless
challenged in seven jurisdictions besides Utah. In four,
it has been upheld. In Minnesota and Texas by the
Supreme Court, and in Montana and North Dakota by
the District Courts. In addition, the constitutionality of
reimbursement for utility relocation costs was upheld
by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in connection with
urban renewal projects in Wilson v. Long Branch, 142
A. 2d 837, 84 7 ( 1958) . The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has recently stated with respect to reimbursement
that the common law rule ... can and may be abrogated
by a s~ecific statutory mandate directing the payment
of relocation costs ... Delaware River-Port Authority v.
Pennsylvania Public Service Commission, 145 A. 2d 172
( 1958). In Maryland, the Court of Appeals has held that
a statute providing for compensation for damages
caused by the construction of a tunnel in Baltimore Harbor required the State Road Commission to reimburse
utilities for relocation expenses. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. State Roads Commission, 134 A. 2d 312
( 1957).
Summarizing, we find that since 1957 reimbursement of utilities for relocation expenses has been approved by the highest courts of the following states:
Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey,· Pennsylvania and Texas. Its constitutionality has

14
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been upheld by the lower courts of Montana and North
Dakota. In addition, in Florida, Georgia, Nebraska and
Oklahoma, the Attorneys General have ruled to the same
effect.
Unless the conclusion is accepted that all the legislative bodies and courts acted unreasonably, it is impossible for the Appellant to sustain the burden of establishing that a legislative determination made by so many
legislators and sustained by so many courts is invalid
beyond a reasonable doubt. Viewed in the most favorable light, Appellant's arguments at best do no more
than raise a doubt as to the constitutionality and wisdom
of Chapter 53. But even if Appellant is successful in
raising such doubts, it cannot prevail here under the elementary rules discussed, supra.
It is submitted that the Appellant has not and cannot sustain the burden of overcoming this presumption.
Nevertheless, we shall show that it was eminently reasonable for the Legislature to adopt Chapter 53.
It is well established that the use of public highways
by utilities for the location of their facilities is not only
proper, but is required by the public interest. This court
has stated that under Utah laws highways are devoted
to the public use and are useful not only for surface
transportation but also for utility purposes essential to
the public welfare. In White v. Salt Lake City ( 1952),
121 U. 134, 239 P. 2d 210, 214, the Court quoted with
approval the following language of the Ohio Court:
"'... Some of the highways of our state were
originally Indian paths or paths established by
wild animals. By a process of evolution they successively became foot-paths of the settlers, bridle

15
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paths, ways for pack animals, ways for horsedrawn vehicles, ways for motor-propelled vehicles
and electric street cars, ways for wires for telephone and telegraph service and for the transmission of electric energy, ways for pipes for
water, sewage, gas, steam, hot water, and other
utilities.
* * * * * * * *
" 'The evolution of public utilities and the widespread and ever-increasing use of public utility
service throughout the state have greatly varied
the uses of streets and highways. It is doubtful
whether this great variety of us·es has really increased the burdens. The increased burdens upon
the highways are caused primarily by the largely
increased population, and the demands of the
people for necessities, conveniences, and luxuries
of modern living conditions .... It is hardly correct to say that by such new adaptations the·
streets and highways are subjected to uses not
contemplated when highways were laid out many
years ago. It would be more correct to say that
present uses are the progression and modern development of the same uses and purposes. The
new appliances are but rapid transit methods of
supplying the modern wants of the people, the
wires supplanting the messenger, the carrier and
the postman, and the rails and pipe lines supplanting in part the vehicular traffic.'" (Emphasis
added by court)

-The principle is further stated in the recent case of
Minneapolis Gas Co. v. Zimmerman, 91 N.W. 2d 642, 648
(Minn. 1958) as follows:
" ... The concept of the functional uses or purposes of a highway has constantly expanded with
the advancement of civilization until today a highway no longer exists for the limited though principal, purpose of vehicular travel or transportation of persons and property. over its surface. . . .
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" ... The soundness of the view that the placing
of utility facilities upon a right-of-way is one of
the proper uses of a highway benefiting the public
is emphasized by the fact that convenience and
economy result therefrom to utility users, who are
usually located near highways, and by the further
fact that, it is in the interest of the public welfare
-in the view of our ever-increasing populationto make full and efficient use of the land surface
occupied by public roads."
Direct recognition of the public interest in the use
of the highways for utility facilities is found in Sections
10-8-21 and 17-5-39, UCA, 1953, authorizing cities and
counties to allow public utility corporations to use the
streets and highways for their facilities.
For many years, the joint use of the highways by
vehicular traffic and the newer methods of communication caused no problem. Even though the invention of
the automobile revolutionized the transportation of persons and property, there was no real conflict of interest
between this mode of transportation and utility facilities
until after World War II, when an explosive increase in
automobile traffic occurred. It was soon realized that
this required a network of widened, high-speed, safe highways, which is now being constructed with the aid of the
Federal government. This expanded construction of
Federal-Aid highways, with the consequent necessity
of relocating utility facilities brought about not for utility purposes, but solely to accommodate the demands of
vehicular traffic, imposed a financial burden on utility
companies that was beyond anybody's imagination at the
time the common law rule requiring uncompensated relocation was developed. It is not too much to say that when
applied to the requirements of the vastly expanded Fed17
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eral-Aid highway system of today, as contrasted with the
purely local roads of the past, such rule has become
unreasonable. It is for this reason that the Congress
decided to encourage and facilitate reimbursement for
relocation expenses.
Let us briefly consider the alternatives which faced
the 1957 Legislature. The cost of relocation caused by
the construction of Federal-Aid highways had to be
borne by someone, either the highway users through
taxes or the utilities' users through higher rates. The
rule that uncompensated relocation could be required
flowed from the police power of the state over public
highways and as we have pointed out, supra, the Legislature has the power to change any such rule in the exercise of the police power. There were very strong reasons
why it would be not only equitable but in the public interest, to change such rule of non-compensation for reloca-:
tion expenses.
A statement of some of these reasons is found in
Senate Report No. 1407, 85th Cong. 2d Sess.:
"It is submitted that there was valid reason
for the States to amend their laws. The conditions
under which utilities agreed to bear the burden of
relocation costs disappeared, or at the very least
were radically and substantially changed, with
the enactment of Federal-Aid Highway Act of
1956.
"In the old days, such relocation costs were
encountered on a gradual and small scale. They
embraced relatively minor operations in type.
Their sum total was within the reach of the utilities' ability to fund same, whether the utility was
publicly, privately, or cooperatively owned.
"Under the act of 1956 all of this was heavily

18
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changed. A crash program of unprecedented
scale was inaugurated. Federal funds available
for highway construction rocketed from $875,000
to $2 billion within a single year. Greater increases are scheduled for following years. In addition, the type of construction changed. The
modern, multilane, high speed traffic ways require
rights-of-way of spectacular width; cloverleafs,
over-passes, and under-passes, and long distances
thereof through urban areas, bringing expressways to the heart of metropolitan centers.
"These changes brought about inordinate expenditures for moving vast amounts of facilities
at a great cost to the users of the utilities. They
bring about a tremendously different treatment
than when highway improvement was a local convenience and local cost, relatively speaking." U. S.
Code Congressional and Administrative News,
Vol. 2, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., P. 2396 (1958)
In considering these factors, the Legislature was
not concerned with the protection of stockholders or
owners of public utility companies. Regulated utilities
have no revenues other than the rates paid by their subscribers from which to pay relocation expenses. Under
the law of Utah, utilities are entitled to a fair return
on the value of the property devoted to the public service.
Relocation costs are an expense item chargeable to operating expenses or are capital expenses and thus increase
the rate base on which utilities are entitled to earn.
These factors have found express judicial recognition.
Thus, the Minnesota Supreme Court said in Minneapolis
Gas Co. v. Zimmerman, supra, (91 N.W. 2d at p. 652) :
" ... If the utilities located in this state must
undertake relocation of their facilities· without
a right to reimbursement their costs will be substantially increased and this in turn will be reflected in higher utility rates in Minnesota
communities."

19
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In Department of Highways v. Pennsylvania Public
Utility Commission, 136 A. 2d 473, 477 (1957), reversed
on other grounds, 145 A. 2d 538, the Court said:
"The cost of relocating the utilities enters into
the rate structure of the public utility companies,
and is paid for by the companies' rate payers. It
i~ error to intimate or suggest that such cost is
borne by the officials or even the stockholders of
the companies. The question of whether the cost
of the required relocation of telephone poles
erected upon the rights-of-way with authority of
the Commonwealth, should be paid on the telephone bills or at the gasoline pumps has been a
matter of governmental concern for some years.

"

See also Delaware Port Authority v. Public Service
Commission, 180 Pa. Super. 318, 119 A. 2d 855, 858
( 1956) , where the Court said:
". . . If the Electric Company were obliged to
pay these and like costs at other crossings which
will amount to a total of about $320,000, that
utility would be entitled to add the amount to its
rate base, to be recovered from its rate payers in
addition to a fair return on the total expenditure
over the life of the new facilities. The rate payers
of the Electric Company as such will receive no
benefit from the relocation of its facilities nor
from the completion of the project and there is no
reason why they should contribute to its cost.
The bridge is an interstate link in a system of national highways. Tolls paid by those who use the
bridge will be adequate to meet the entire costs
incident to its construction. They will be the
direct beneficiaries of the completed project and
it is they alone who shall pay."
Thus, the Legislature had to make a decision regarding the equitable allocation of these costs, arising
out of the construction of Federal-Aid highways, between
20
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the users and rate payers of the local utility companies
and the highway users. In making this decision, it found
that the utility users would receive no improvement in
service for the higher rates imposed on them and, in
addition, they would be compelled to make a double
contribution to the Federal-Aid highway program, once
in their federal taxes, and a second time in higher utility
rates.
It can hardly be seriously argued that the Legislature is without power to choose a fair and equitable allocation of relocation costs rather than an unfair and inequitable one.
In view of the foregoing, the real question in this
case is whether the Utah Constitution places the Legislature in a position which would prevent it from changing
the law not only in accordance with justice and equity,
but also for compelling economic reasons. We submit
that merely to state this question is to answer it. Nevertheless, we will now direct our attention to the specific
constitutional objections raised in the Appellant's Brief
to which we now turn.
III.
REIMBURSEMENT BY THE STATE TO PUBLICLY, PRIVATELY AND COOPERATIVELY
OWNED UTILITIES, INCLUDING DRAINAGE AND IRRIGATION SYSTEMS AND
UTILITIES OWNED BY ALL POLITICAL
SUBDIVISIONS, FOR RELOCATION OF FACILITIES AS AUTHORIZED BY CHAPTER
53, LAWS OF UTAH 1957, DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A LENDING OF THE CREDIT OF
THE STATE IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE
VI, SECTION 31 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
UTAH.

21
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The Appellant contends that the Relocation Law
violates Article VI, Section 31 of the Utah Constitution
which provides :
"The Legislature shall not authorize the State,
or any county, city, town, township, district or
other political subdivision of the State to lend its
credit or subscribe to stock or bonds in aid of any
railroad, telegraph or other private individual or
corporate enterprise or undertaking."
The purpose and effect of Article VI, Section 31 is
to prohibit a business partnership between the state and
individuals or private corporations. The basic test in
determining whether a statute violates this section of the
Constitution is whether the purported expenditure is for
a private or public purpose. Wallberg v. Utah Public
Welfare Commission, 115 U. 242,203 P. 2d 935.
Thus, the question for decision is whether expenditures for the costs of relocation of utility facilities are
~xpenditures for a public purpose. That the answer must
be in- the affirmative is clear for a number of reasons.
At the outset, we wish to point out that the weight
of authority is to the effect that payment of relocation
expenses serves a valid public purpose. The following
ju.risdictions uphold reimbursement of relocation expenses as against attacks based on constitutional provisions similar to Article VI, Section 31 of the Utah Constitution: Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania and Texas.
We have shown, supra, that the Relocation Law was
enacted by the Legislature, in the exercise of the police
power, to prescribe a substantive rule of law _for the
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future. Thus, it is clear that if the Legislature repeals
taxes for the future, this does not result in a gift, whereas
the forgiving of past due taxes would be a gift. Another
example may be mentioned. Every citizen, with certain
statutory exceptions, is under a duty to render jury
service. This duty could be compelled without compensation. Nevertheless, Section 78-46-5, UCA 1953, prescribes certain fees for jurors. These payments have
been increased, the last increase to eight dollars per day
being found in Chapter 59, Laws of Utah 1949. Under
the Appellant's view, the 1949 statute would be unconstitutional because the state could have compelled jury
service at the lower fee scale then in effect. But, of
course, the 1949 statute created enforceable legal rights
for the future, and payment of the increased fees and
mileage is not a gift of public funds. A different situation would be presented if a statute attempted to authorize additional payments for jury service rendered prior
to the effective date of the statute.
It is clear, therefore, that the Legislature could
validly create a legal right of reimbursement for the
future and that payment of such legal claim cannot constitute a gift. Indeed, the courts have expressly held that
the common law rule governing relocation expenses is
subject to statutory change. The most recent statement
to this effect is found in the decision of the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania in Delaware River Port Authority
v. Pennsylvania Public Service Commission, 145 A. 2d
172, 175. The Court said:
"This common law rule, however, can and may
be abrogated by a specific statutory mandate
directing the payment of relocation costs to the
non-transportation utilities involved."
23
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In Opinion of the Justices, 132 A. 2d 613, 615, the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire said:
"The common-law rule which places the costs
of relocating utility facilities on the owner 'specifically admits of legislative change.'"
To the same effect is Westchester EleBtric R. Co. v.
Westchester County Park Commission, 174 N.E. 660
(N.Y. Ct. of App.). The Court said:
"At common law, holders of franchises take the
risk of the location of their structures in public
highways and are bound to make such changes
at their own charge as public convenience or security requires, but this common-law rule is subject to alteration by statute. Public security demands that the driveway of a great park over
which millions of motor vehicles proceed at a high
rate of speed shall not cross city and village streets
at grade. A statute imposing the expense of
changes necessarily incidental to the elevation of
such highways, upon the public body directing
such changes would not conflict with any- consti.;.
tutional prohibition. The inquiry is, therefore,
directed to the existence of such a statute." (Emphasis added)
Thus, if the Relocation Law is viewed as what it is,
a prospective modification of a substantive rule of the
common law, it becomes apparent that the allegation
that it involves a gift of public funds is without
substance.
In Utah, as well as in almost every other state,
utilities have long had authority to occupy public highways for the purpose of providing necessary utility services to the public. There are no judicial decisions holding
that such grants are donations or gifts, but to the contrary such grants have been specifically upheld.
24·
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In State ex inf. McKittrick v. Southwestern Bell
Telephone Company, 92 S.W. 2d 612 (Mo.), it was
alleged that a statute giving telephone and telegraph
companies the right to place their facilities on the highways without payment was in violation of a constitutional provision similar to Article VI, Section 31.
The Court said :
" ... The respondent is a public utility engaged
in furnishing telephone service to the general
public. The General Assembly no doubt considered that the benefit to the general public arising
from the promotion of the extension of such service justified the granting of the privilege of the
use of the highways. While that benefit may not
be said to be a formal consideration, as that term
is generally understood, yet it is that benefit and
that consideration which takes this grant out of
the class of grants prohibited by the Constitution."
And the theory thus followed in connection with
these grants and their constitutional validity was reiterated in State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Union
Electric Co. of Missouri, 142 S.W. 2d 1099 (1940);
Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Southwestern
Bell Telephone Co. (Arkansas), 178 S.W. 2d 1002 (1944)
and Los Angeles County v. Southern California Telephone Company, 196 P. 2d 773.
In Minneapolis Gas Co. v. Zimmerman, supra, the
Minnesota Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule that "the
use of highway rights of way for the transmission of
public intelligence and public utility services confers
important and direct benefits upon the public and ...
such use is not solely for the benefit and convenience of
the utilities."
25
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These cases illustrate that the ban of constitutional
provisions similar to Article VI, Section 31 does not fall
upon the grant by the state, counties or cities to utilities
of the use of public ways. The benefits flowing to the
public from such uses of highway rights of way are
apparent from an examination of Respondents' status.
Respondents are utility companies engaged in the business of furnishing communications, fuel and electric
power to the public at just and reasonable rates; they
are under a legal duty to serve the public; their business
is affected with a public interest and results in public
benefit. Use of highways for the location of Respondents'
facilities promotes the extension of such service to the
greatest number of people at th.e lowest reasonable cost.
In Utah Light & Traction Co. v. Public Service Comm.,
101 U. 99, 118 P. 2d 683, 689, this Court said:
"Thus the right to lay rail or pipes, or string
wires or set poles along a public street is not an
ordinary business in which everyone may eng~ge,
or a use everyone may make of the street, but is
a special privilege, a franchise to be granted for
the accomplishment of public objects."
If permitting a utility to use a.nd occupy portions
of the rights of way of public highways is not a prohibited lending of the credit of the state because of the
public benefits which will result from the operation of
such utility, why is it any less true that no prohibited
lending of the credit of the state is involved when the
state reimburses the utility for the cost of relocating its
facilities, and thereby insures the continuance of service
at reasonable rates. The cases, we respectfully urge,
establish that the latter is permissible and, thus, we do
not. fl.nd how it is debatable that the same public purpose
26
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which supports the original grant also supports Chapter
53.

In Maine, the 1957 Legislature passed an act similar
to Chapter 53. Article 9, Section 14 of the Maine Constitution provides that "the credit of the State shall not
be directly nor indirectly loaned in any case. . . ." In
Opinion of the Justices, 132 A. 2d 440 ( 1957), the Court
held that the Act did not violate this section of the Constitution, saying at page 443:
" ... At common law there is no obligation to
pay for the removal or relocation of public utility
facilities required by changes in highways. (Citing cases) The State, however, may in our view,
pay for the cost of relocating such facilities, if it
chooses to do so. The purpose of such expenditures
is public in nature, and the extent and conditions
under which the Sta-te may meet such costs are
for the Legislature to determine." (Emphasis
supplied)
The New Hampshire Supreme Court likewise rendered an opinion upholding the constitutionality of a
statute similar to Chapter 53 in Opinion of the Justices,
132 A. 2d 613 ( 1957). The Court held that conceding
that in absence of statute, utilities are obligated to relocate at their own expense, the Legislature has the power
to relieve them of that burden and such legislative action
did not violate the New Hampshire Constitution. The
Court said at page 614:
"While the obligation to remove or relocate
utility facilities is placed on the owner by the
common law, the Legislature may change this
rule. (Citing cases) This principle was expressed
in the recent Opinion of the Justices, Me. 132 A.
2d 440 (decided May 6, 1957) as follows: 'The
State, however, may, in our view, pay for the cost
27
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of relocating such facilities, if it chooses to do so.
The purpose of such expenditures is public .in
nature and the extent and conditions under which
the State may meet such costs are for the Legislature to determine.' The common-law rule which
places the costs of relocating utility facilities on
the owner 'specifically admits of legislative
change.' Relocation of Public Utilities Due to
Highway Improvement - An Analysis of Legal
Aspects, Highway Research Board Special Report
21, p. 40 (1955). If the Legislature decides to
make such a change it would not be a violation of
our Constitution, Part II, Article 5th or Part I,
Article 10th. (Citing cases)" (Emphasis supplied)
Contrary to the statement of Appellant on page 14
of its Brief, both the Maine and New Hampshire Supreme
Courts considered constitutional provisions similar to
Article VI, Section 31.
The Maine Constitution provides that "the credit
of the state shall not be directly nor indirectly loaned
in any case" and, as noted above, the Court held that
the Relocation Law did not violate the Constitution.
In New Hampshire the Court referred to Part II,
Article 5th and Part I, Article lOth of the New Hampshire Constitution. Both of these provisions relate to the
giving or loaning of the credit of the state and in Opinion
of the Justices (New Hampshire), 190 Atl. 425, the
Court adopted the universal view that "money raised by
taxation can be used only for public purposes and not for
the advantage of private individuals." In quoting from
Cooley, Taxation, page 90, the Court said:
'' ... Taxation for the purpose of raising money
from the public to be given or even loaned to private parties, in order that they may use it in
28
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their individual business enterprises, is not recognized as for public use."
With this clear cut precedent in mind regarding
the use of public funds, the New Hampshire Supreme
Court nevertheless held that the statute allowing reimbursement to utilities of their relocation expenses was
not a gift or a lending of the credit of the state.
In Minneapolis Gas Co. v. L. P. Zimmerman, supra,
the Supreme Court of Minnesota upheld a statute identical in legal effect to Chapter 53. The Minnesota statute
was passed by the Legislature in 1957 and its purpose
was to take advantage of the Federal-Aid Highway Act
of 1956 which had been recently enacted by Congress.
The Minnesota Constitution, Article IX, Section 10,
almost identical with Article VI, Section 31 of the Utah
Constitution, provides that "the credit of the state shall
never be given or loaned in aid of any individual, association or corporation, . . ."
In construing this provision of the Constitution, the
Court said (page 651 ) :
"In short, public funds shall be used solely
public purposes and shall never be used, or
cumbered by pledging the state's credit, in
furtherance of any private purpose or in the
of any private individual or entity."

for
enthe
aid

The Court further said:
"We have already pointed out that the use of
rights of way by utilities for locating their facilities is one of the primary purposes for which
highways are designed, even though their principle use is for public travel and transportation of
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persons and property. It follows that where it
becomes reasonably necessary to relocate such
utility facilities in order to improve the highway
for public travel ... an expenditure of funds to
effect such relocation is properly a governmental
function exercised for a public purpose of primary
benefit to the entire community. It is primary for
a public purpose not only because the relocation
is made necessary in order to expedite public
travel and transportation, but also for other substantial reasons." (Emphasis supplied)
The Court further stated at page 652:
"It is argued, however, that since plaintiff utility at common law and under the terms of the
occupancy permits issued to it by the state, was
entitled to no reimbursement and was solely responsible for all costs of relocating its facilities
on the highway, the reimbursement act, in authorizing payment of such relocation costs from the
highway fund, confers upon the plaintiff a gratuity of public monies in violation of Minnesota
.Constitution, Article IX, Sections 1 and 10. This
argument ignores the well established principl~
followed by other jurisdictions with identical or
similar constitutional provisions-that, although
gratuities and benevolences of public monies in
aid of private undertaking are prohibited, the
state Constitution does not prohibit the legislature
from by prospective action (that is by an enactment prior to the ordering of a relocation of utility
facilities or prior to the commencement of a great
public work requiring such relocation) , fixing the
conditions of performance and making provisions
for the future recognition of claims for damages
founded on equity and justice, although such
claims would otherwise be damnum absque injuria
and unenforceable against the state."
The Appellant has attempted to discount the soundness of the Minnesota decision by arguing that the Court

ao·
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was influenced solely by the economic consequences of its
decision. We submit that such is not the case. The Court
took notice of the economic factors which had been considered by the legislature and discussed the "realities of
the situation" but prior to that point in its opinion it had
answered affirmatively the question of whether reimbursement to utilities for relocation of their facilities
was an expenditure for a public purpose which was of
benefit to the community and which was related to the
functions of government.
On January 6, 1960, the Supreme Court of Texas
in the State of Texas v. City of Dallas, Southwes~tern Bell
Telephone Co., Dallas Power and Light Co. and Lone
Star Gas Co., ________ S.W. 2d ________ (see Appendix) upheld
the constitutionality of the Texas Relocation Law against
the attack that it was a lending of the credit of the State
in violation of Article III, Sections 50 and 51 of the
Texas Constitution. The Court said:
"Respondents benefit from the statute only in
the sense that they are relieved of a financial burden which they could be required to bear. The
question to be decided then is whether the use of
public funds to pay part or all of the loss or expense to which an individual or corporation is subjected by the state in the exercise of its police
power is an unconstitutional donation for a private purpose. We think not provided the statute
creating the right of reimbursement operates
prospectively, deals with the matter in which the
public has a real and legitimate interest, and is
not fraudulent, arbitrary or capricious."
The Maine, New Hampshire, Minnesota and Texas
decisions are well-reasoned and logical opinions substan-
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tiated by sound legal precedent and authorities and
should be followed by this Court.
There are many authorities which, while dealing
with somewhat different statutes, hold that a Legislature can constitutionally relieve a utility of the cost
of effecting changes in its facilities to accommodate
public improvements. These decisions support the same
legal princi pies that sustain the validity of Chapter 53.
The most recent of these cases is Wilson v. Long
Branch, 142 A. 2d 837, where the Supreme Court of New
Jersey upheld the constitutionality of the provision in
the Blighted Area Act pursuant to which the expense
of utility relocation necessitated by an urban redevelopment plan was to be paid as a part of the cost of the
municipal project. The Court said (142 A. 2d at 847):
"Utilities are necessary adjuncts of the public
welfare. Their business operations and their
property have been subject to special legislative
treatment for many years ..... In the present context, uninterrupted service during and after completion of the redevelopment project is vital.
Where removal of the facilities is necessary, it is
important that the relocation be as expeditious
and as controversy-free as possible. That end is
intimately related to the achievement of the overall public purpose. . . "
A leading case is Oswego a.nd S. R. Co. v. State,
124 N. E. 8 (N.Y. Ct. of App.). In that case, the railroad had built its bridge pursuant to a permit issued by
the · state which required the railroad to remove the
bridge at its own expense. Subsequently, the river was
improved for navigation and a statute was passed which
provided for the state to pay the cost of constructing a
32
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new bridge, notwithstanding the agreement which the
railroad had made and the fact that in New York the
state could, in the exercise of its police power, improve
navigation and require uncompensated relocation of the
bridge. The Court held that, in the Legislature's discretion, it could assume that burden without contravening Article 8, Section 9 of the New York Constitution,
which provided that "neither the credit nor the money
of the state shall be given or loaned to or in aid of any
association, corporation, or private undertaking."
In rendering the opinion of the Court, Justice Cardozo made the following statement:
"The state was about to execute a great public
work. It saw that in the doing of that work there
would be destruction of private property. Much
of the damage would be damnum absque injuria.
None the less it would be damage. The result
would be inequality in the distribution of public
burdens. Some would pay more dearly than others
in proportion to benefits received. This inequality
the Legislature, fixing in advance the conditions
of the undertaking, had the power to correct. It
might refuse to launch an enterprise at the price
of hardship and oppression. There was power to
destroy, and leave the loss where it might fall.
There was also power to pay for the destruction,
and thereby re-establish some uniformity of proportion between benefits and burdens. The question was for the Legislature whether the equity
of compensation was strong enough to merit recognition. We cannot hold it to be illusory."
In discussing the foregoing case on page 9 of its
Brief, the Appellant has stated that "the New York
Courts have dealt with this problem as a statutory one
only and have reached different conclusions depending
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upon the statute involved." This is not entirely correct.
In the Oswego case, the Court dealt specifically with a
constitutional provision almost identical with Article VI,
Section 31 of the Utah Constitution. In Westchester
Electric R. R. Co. vs. Westchester County Park Commission, supra, the Court clearly stated that a statute
imposing the expense of utility relocation upon the public
body directing such changes "did not conflict with any
constitutional prohibition."
In Transit Commission vs. Long Island R. R. Co.,
171 N. E. 565 and New Y_ork Tunnel Authority vs. Consolidated Edison Co., 68 N.E. 2d 445, the New York
Court of Appeals· reaffirmed its previous· rulings that
the common law rule could be changed by statutory
enactment, but held that the Legislature had not expressly provided in the statutory provisions under consideration that the cost of relocation should be borne by
the state.
On page 10 of its Brief, Appellant has quoted from
New Orleans Gaslight Co. vs. Drainage Commission of
New Orleans, 197 U.S. 453, in support of the proposition
that a utility is required to pay its own relocation costs
and that the grant of rights in the subsurface are held
subject to such reasonable regulation as the public health
and safety may require. We accept the reasoning of the
New Orleans case and the decision which required the
utility to relocate at its own expense. However, we wish
to point out that the utility in the Netv Orleans case was
not allowed reimbursement for relocating its facilities
because the common law rule, requiring uncompensated
relocations, had not been changed by statute. There is
nothing in the New Orleans case to substantiate Appel-
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lant's position that a statutory enactment changing the
common law rule would be unconstitutional.
In City of Beaumont v. Priddie, 65 S.W. 2d 434
(Tex. Civ. App.), dismissed as 1noot, 95 S.W. 2d 1290, an
agreement had been made between the city and the railroad for sharing expenses in the elimination of grade
crossings. The Court held that the contract did not violate a constitutional provision similar to Article VI,
Section 31, and stated:
"But, although the state may compel the railroad to bear the entire expense of grade separation, nevertheless it is not required to do so, but
may bear the entire expense itself, or apportion it
between itself an.d the railroad. While this power
is generally recognized, the cases in which it has
been challenged as violative of constitutional provisions similar to those in this state inhibiting the
state or its subdivisions from making donations
to private corporations or individuals appear to
be rare. Those in which the question has been
considered uniformly held that state or municipal
contribution to the expense does not come within
such inhibition. Lehigh Valley Ry. v. Canal
Board, 204 N.Y. 471, 97 N.E. 964, Ann. Cas.
1913C, 1228; Brooke v Philadelphia, 162 Pa. 123,
29 A. 387, 24 L.R.A. 781. We think the soundness
of this holding cannot seriously be questioned.
While the paramount duty rests upon the railroad
to provide originally and thereafter to maintain
the safety of the crossing, regardless of the requirements in that regard brought about by
changes in conditions, still the interest therein of
the state as representative of the public is such
that the expenditure of public funds in this regard
is a legitimate governmental function, and does
not properly fall within the designation of a donation of public funds to a private enterprise. In the
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infinite variety of situations which present themselves, the state may properly make an adjustment
of the expense, as the peculiar equities of each situation may in its judgment dictate. In this matter
the judgment of the state is supreme, subject to
judicial review only in case of fraudulent or arbitrary abuse of power." (Emphasis supplied)
In Brooke v. City of Philadelphia, 29 Atl. 387 (Pa.
1894), the city desired to eliminate a grade crossing and
agreed with the railroad that each would bear one-half
of the expense. It was contended that this agreement
violated the provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution
prohibiting the lending of the credit of municipalities to
corporations or individuals. The Court rejected this contention, and added the observation that the city could
even have borne the entire expense if it had seen fit to do
.
s_o, saying:
"As to the second averment of the bill, -that
the debt to be created, to· the extent of one-half,
is practically a loan· of the city's credit to the
Philadelphia & Reading Railroad· Company, a private corporation, -we are of the opinion it cannot be sustained. The avoidance of grade crossing is not only desirable, but, with the gro,vth of
the city in business and population, may be considered absolutely necessary. . . · . And the city
has the power to assume the entire expense of the
municipal improvement.''
In Baltimore Gas and Elect1'ic Co. v. State Roads
Commission, 134 A. 2d 312 ( Md. 1957), the Court of
Appeals of Maryland held that under a statute providin·g that all private property damaged or destroyed in
constructing a tunnel in Baltimore Harbor should be restored or adequate compensation made therefor, the utility com~any ~~s entitled to be reimbursed for the cost
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of the removal, relocation, and reconstruction of its
facilities located in, on, or under public highways. The
Court recognized that the statute "puts an obligation
on the Commission, as an agency to whom the State
has delegated the police power necessary for the doing
of the work authorized, that it would not bear otherwise." ( p. 315) In rejecting the Commission's attack,
it said that the statute "does not take from the Commission the right or the power to decide what project is to
be built, or how; no more does it shackle its right and
power to make a public utility move its facilities if they
are in the path of construction. It merely says that
policy of the State is to pay for the cost of removal and
relocation .... " ( p. 317) See also Mayor and City Council of Baltimore vs. Baltimore Gas and Electric Company
________ A. 2d ________ (Dec. 11, 1959).
Thus, in cases where a similar constitutional ques~
tion was raised, the courts have been almost unanimous
in their rejection of contentions of the character advanced by Appellant and have held that State expenditures for relocation costs are for a proper public purpose.
We believe it pertinent to point out that in 1917
the State of Utah enacted legislation which provided
that the Public Service Commission of Utah should have
authority to prescribe the terms and conditions for the
elimination of railroad grade crossings and "the proportions in which the expense of the alterations or abolition of such crossings or the separation of such grades
shall be divided between the railroad or street railroad
corporations affected, or between such corporations and
the state, county, municipality or other public authority
in interest." Chapter 47, Laws of Utah 1917. Section
54.-4-15, UCA 1953.
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This statutory provision has been in effect for 43
years and although it is impossible to tell in how many
instances cost sharing under this statute has been accomplished, it may reasonably be assumed that such have
been made and that public monies have been used to
defray the state, county or municipal share thereof. This
statute has been reviewed by this Court in Denver and
Rio Grande R. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of
Utah, 51 U. 623, 172 Pac. 479; Union Pacific R. Co. v.
Public Service Commission, 103 U. 186, 134 P. 2d 469;
and Provo City vs. Department of Business Regulation,
118 U. 1, 218 P. 2d 675, and the authority of the Public
Service Commission to prescribe the manner and terms
upon which railroad tracks may be constructed and maintained across a public street has been affirmed in each
case. We respectfully submit that this statutory provision is the same in principle as the Relocation Law and
that the use of public funds for railroad grade separations or utility relocations does not contravene Article
VI, Section 31 of the Constitution.
And why is it that there is no difference between
the railroad grade separation cases and the case before
the Court? That reason, to us, seems obvious. In the
railroad cases, the railroad may be compelled at common law to stand all the cost of changing the grade or its
bridges where this is necessary to accommodate a superior public need. Erie Railroad Co. v. Board of Public
Utility Commissioners, 254 U.S. 394; Missouri Pacific
R. R. Co. v. City of Ornaha, 235 U.S. 121; Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul R. R. Co. vs. City of Minneapolis,
232 U.S. 430. As the United States Supreme Court in
the last cited case said:
"It is well settled that railroad corporations
38
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may be required, at their own expense, not only to
abolish existing grade crossings, but also to build
and maintain suitable bridges or viaducts to carry
highways, newly laid out, over their tracks, or to
carry their tracks over such highways."
In the case before the Court and assuming the validity of the common law rule, a utility may also be compelled to adjust or relocate its facilities at its expense
in response to the necessities of the public. If, then, it is
valid for a state to relieve all or a part of a burden which
it may place entirely upon a railroad without violating
constitutional provisions like Article ·vi, Section 31, then
certainly a legislative effort to relieve non-railroad utilities from a like or similar burden is also valid.
We also direct the Court's attention to Section
10-7-19, UCA 1953, wherein cities and towns are permitted to "aid and encourage the building of railroads"
by grants of real property owned by the City. This
statute was adopted in 1901, has been reviewed by the
Supreme Court in Knight v. Thomas, 35 U. 470, 101 Pac.
383; and its constitutionality never questioned· even
though the prohibitions of Article VI, Section 31 apply
to cities and towns as well as to the state.
Appellant in arguing that Chapter 53 contravenes
Article VI, Section 31, relies solely on decisions by the
Supreme Courts of New Mexico, Tennessee and Idaho.
We respectfully submit that these decisions are contrary
to the weight of authority and that the cases heretofore
cited should be followed by this Honorable Court.
In State of Tennessee ex rel. Leach v. Southern Bell
Tel. & Tel. Co., 319 S.W. 2d 90 ( 1958), a closely divided
court held that the Tennessee Relocation Law was uncon39
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stitutional in that it was a lending of the credit of the
state.
The basic premise of the majority opinion was that
a utility's right on the highway was a mere gratuitous
privilege and that therefore there is no equity in reimbursing it for relocation expenses. It is apparent that
the Tennessee Court had been led into a misconception
of the utility's right, which is directly contrary to_ the
generally accepted rule of law, including the law of Tennessee. Chattanooga v. Tennessee Electric Power Co.,
112 s.w. 2d 385. *
However, even assuming that the Tennessee Court's
characterization of a utility's right of occupancy is correct, its decision should not be followed because its sole
basis is not relevant to the constitutional issue here
involved. The lawmaking power of the Legislature is
obviously not dependent on the technical nature of the
utilities' right. Even if they had a mere privilege the
Legislature could provide for reimbursement of relocation expenses on Federal-Aid highways.
This misconception of the issues by the Tennessee
Court necessarily led to further errors. Thus, in failing
to recognize that the property rights of the utilities
could be burdened or curtailed only in the proper exercise of the police power and therefore the issue before
it was the reasonableness of the exercise of the police
'* It should be noted that the franchises granted by the cities or counties
to the Respondents herein vest in the franchise holder a property right which
is protected by both the State and Federal Constitution. Owensboro v. Cum·
berland Tel. r/:r Tel. Co., 230 U.S. 58; Boise Artesian H. r/:r C. Water Co. v.
Boise City, 230 U.S. 67; Russell v. Sebastian, 233 U.S. 195; Louisville v. Cum·
berland Tel. r/:r Tel. Co., 224 U.S. 649; Knoxville v. Africa, 77 Fed. 501, 507;
City of Lansing v. JUichigan Power Co., 150 N."'· 250; City of Summerville v.
Georgia Power Co., 55 S.E. 2d 540.
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power by the Legislature in prescribing rules of law
for the future, the Court necessarily failed to give effect
to the presumption of the constitutionality of legislative
action. An examination of the majority opinion clearly
shows that the court substituted its judgment as to the
wisdom of the legislation for that of the Legislature.
The majority opinion makes a brief reference to the
case of Oswego & S. R. Co., et al. v. State, supra, in which
it does not take issue with Mr. Justice Cardozo's opinion,
but attempts to distinguish it by the statement that:
"The whole basis of Justice Cardozo's' opinion
is that the legislature may enact acts when equity
demands. The facts in the Oswego case showed
that equity did demand that the state step in and
do equity. We have no question of equity in the
present case. The user of the defendants was only
permissive.'"
This is not a valid distinction. The railroad in the
Oswego case constructed its bridge over a navigable
stream under an express agreement that it would reconstruct it at its own expense. Certainly the use made by
the railroad of a location within the confines of a navigable stream was no less permissive than is the use of the
utilities in Tennessee. In Minneapolis Ga8 Co. v. Zimmerman, supra, the Court held that it was equitable and
just to pay a gas company for relocating its lines which
had been originally constructed under a permit issued
by the Commissioner of Highways in which the company
agreed to bear that expense, and expressly relied on the
Oswego case. There were no facts to be found in the
Oswego case (or the Minnesota case) giving rise to any
"equity" not equally present in the Tennessee case or in
the case at bar.
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Finally, the majority of the Tennessee Court failed
to even mention the numerous authorities directly in
point. Instead, it relied exclusively on a Kentucky case,
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Commonwealth, 266 S.W.
2d 308, and a Georgia case, Mulkey v. Quillian, 100 S.E.
2d 268. Neither case supports the decision of the Tennessee Court.
In the Kentucky case, there was no statute, such as
Chapter 53, expressly directing reimbursement for utility
relocation, but the utility nevertheless claimed reimbursement even in absence of such a statute. In denying reimbursement, the Court found that the company's franchise imposed on it the duty to relocate at its own expense.
Having thus held that the company was required
to relocate without compensation under the provisions
of its franchise (there being no contrary statute) the
opinion then contains the following which is obiter
dictum:
". . . If construed as requiring removal and relocation at the expense of the state, the franchise
was in violation of Article II, Section 33, of our
Third Constitution, which was carried over into
Section 177 of our present Constitution, and provided:
'The credit of this Commonwealth shall not
be given or loaned in aid of any person, association, municipality, or corporation.' "

That this statement was not necessary to the decision was recognized by the Court itself as shown by th~
underscored words. The Court had already held that the
franchise could not be "construed as requiring removal
and relocation at the expense of the state." Therefore,
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what might be its opinion if it had construed the franchise otherwise could be nothing but dictum.
Furthermore, the Kentucky Court was not. passing
upon the constitutionality of a statute (such as Chapter
53) which changed the existing Kentucky common law
and declared a changed future public policy applicable
to all utilities. On the contrary, there was involved in the
Kentucky case a special act granting a franchise to a
single utility.
If the Kentucky dictum were to be applied to a general statute like Chapter 53 which lays down a changed
public policy for the future, then it would be irreconcilable with and directly opposed to the many adjudications
directly on the point which have been heretofore cited
and neither could it be supported in the light of previous
Kentucky decisions. Guthrie v. Curlin, 263 S.W. 2d 240
(Ky.).
In Kentucky, as in Utah, the grade crossing elimination acts provide for reimbursing the railroads out of
tax funds which is the same thing in principle as Chapter 53. In Union Light, Heat and Power Company v.
Railroad, 79 S.W. 2d 199 (Ky.), the Court held that
there is no compulsion on the state to make compensation
to railroad companies for relocating their facilities when
necessitated by grade crossing eliminations, but indicated
that an express direction by the Legislature to that effect
would be unobjectionable. The Court there stated:
" ... The reasonable construction of the Elimination Act under these circumstances is to assume
that the people are not to be burdened with any
heavier expe.nse than necessity requires, and that
43
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to relieve the public service corporations having
franchises in the streets of their common-law liabilities and to pass them over to the taxpayer can
only be accomplished by the express direction of
the Legislature.
*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

". . . We think, as did the Court of Appeals of
New York in Transit Commission v. Long Island
Railroad Co., supra, that an express direction of
the Legislature would be required before appellant could recover the expenses here involved."
( pp. 201-202) (Emphasis added)
The dictum contained in Southern Bell v. Commonwealth, supra, is entitled to little consideration since
the constitutional issue was neither raised nor briefed
and since there was no statute in that case which bears
any resemblance to the statute here in issue.
The Georgia case of Mulkey v. Quillian, supra, dealt
with an entirely different type of statute and has no
application to the case at bar. Chapter 53 shifts the burden of paying relocation expenses from the utilities to the
state. The Georgia statute expressly presupposed that
the cost of relocation was chargeable to the utility and
provided that the Highway Department may make loans
to municipally-owned utilities for all or part of the cost
of relocation, such loans to be repaid over a period not to
exceed fifteen years. The Georgia Court held the statute
to be unconstitutional on the sole ground that its Constitution does not permit "the using of public funds for
the purpose of engaging in the money lending business."
Thus, none of the questions here involved were before
the Georgia court, and the Tennessee Court was incorrect
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in stating that the Mulkey case is authority for holding
invalid the Tennessee statute.
The New Mexico case of State Highway Commission
v. Southern Union Gas Co., 332 P. 2d 1007, was in no
small measure based on the foregoing Tennessee decision.
Indeed, the opinion in the New Mexico case makes it
even plainer that the court misconceived the basic issue.
As its only New Mexico authorities, it relied on two
cases, Hutcheson v. Atherton, 99 P. 2d 462, and Harrington v. Atteberry, 153 Pac. 1041. These cases involved
appropriations by the Legislature, without any substantive legislation, to private corporations engaged, respectively, in the holding of county fairs and of a celebration
to commemorate the initial exploration of New Mexico.
In neither case had the Legislature exercised the police
power of the state in prescribing general rules of law
for the future.
Moreover, the New Mexico decision is clearly not
applicable in Utah. It appears from the opinion that
in New Mexico, a public purpose is not enough to support an expenditure of public funds, but that such funds
can be paid only to subordinate governmental agencies
or persons under the control of the state. This rule does
not seem to pertain in any other jurisdiction, and it certainly is not the law in Utah. In Bailey v. Van Dyke,
66 U. 184, 240 Pac. 454, 457, this Court discussed Harrington v. Atteberry, supra, and pointed out that the
New Mexico constitutional provision prohibits grants
to any person or corporation "not under the absolute control of the state." The Utah Court stated: "There is no
such provision in the Utah Constitution."
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The recent decision in State of Idaho vs.ldaho Power
Company, et al., 346 P. 2d 596, is, we submit, based
on a misunderstanding of the purpose and effect of the
Idaho Relocation Law.
The Idaho Court, evidenced by the quotation on
page 20 of Appellant's Brief, viewed the Relocation Law
as giving the utilities a property right on the public
streets and highways and determined that the granting
of such a property right would result in a dimunition
of the quantum of ownership of the public in its public
thoroughfares.
This analysis of the statute is incorrect in that the
Court misconstrued the effect of the Relocation Law.
The Relocation Law of Idaho, as well as Utah, does
not give or attempt to give the utilities a property right
of any kind or character and certainly succeeding legislatures could repeal or amend the law without depriving
the utilities of any property right.
As we have heretofore pointed out, the Relocation
Law is an exercise of the police power by the state. What
type of legal right the utility has once it has placed its
facilities on the public thoroughfare is not changed or
altered by the Relocation Law, and whether such right
is a property right and called an easement, license, incorporeal hereditament or corporeal hereditament or a
permissive right is not pertinent to the question here
at issue.
We are at a loss to understand how the Idaho Court
permitted itself to become enmeshed in the question of
46
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property rights when called upon to construe a statute
which authorized the state to make payments for relocation of utility facilities that had been put in place pursuant to statutory authorization.
The Idaho Court also was mistaken in determining
what the legal rights of the utilities were after placing
their facilities on the highways pursuant to statute or
franchise. Although it is not pertinent to the issues here
before the Court, we wish to point out again that a utility,
once it has placed its facilities on the highways, has a
property right protected by both the federal and state
constitutions (see footnote, page 40) , even though the
state, in the exercise of its police power, can require the
utility to relocate its facilities without liability for the
cost of relocation, and with liability for the cost of relocation when the legislature has so provided.
In attempting to distinguish the decision of Minneapolis Gas Co. v. Zimmerman, supra, the Idaho Court
held that inasmuch as the utilities acquired no property
right upon placing their facilities in the public thoroughfares that the state could not pay for their relocation
because there was no taking, only damages, and therefore the injury would be damnum absque injuria. Here
again the Court was incorrect in that it is clear that in
Idaho the legislature has the right to provide, as it did
in the Relocation Law, for the payment of damages to
property even though there be no taking, but only damages resulting from the construction of Federal-Aid
highways. Idaho-Western Ry. Co. vs. Columbian Conference, 119 Pac. 60, Crane vs. City of Harrison, 232 Pac.
578.

47
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If the issue of whether or not the constitution provides for damages as well as taking of property is pertinent, then there is no question but that in Utah the Legislature has the authority to enact Chapter 53 and provide
for the payment of damages. Article I, Section 22, Utah
Constitution and Section 78-34-10, UCA, 1953. Therefore, we respectfully submit that the Court should not
adopt the rationale and decision of the Idaho Court.
We now turn to some of the Utah cases construing
Article VI, Section 31. This section of the Constitution
was construed in Bailey vs. Va.n Dyke, supra, as not prohibiting a county from appropriating money for agricultural extension work in the face of allegations that
the funds appropriated enured to the benefit of the Farm
Bureau, a private association.
In Lehi City vs. Meiling, 87 U. 234, 48 P. 2d 530,
551, Mr. Justice Wolfe in referring to Article VI, Section 31, said:
"In other words, this section is directed against
the practice which "\vas prevelant at the time our
Constitution was drafted amongst states and
municipalities, to-wit, that of aiding private ventures, instituted for private profit but which it
was thought would indirectly benefit and develop
the particular local division loaning its credit."
In Wallberg v. Utah Public Welfare Commission,
115 U. 242, 203 P. 2d 935, the Utah Public Assistance
Act was held not to violate Article VI, Section 31. The
act provided that the Welfare Commission might "loan"
48
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money to needy aged persons upon pledge of their real
property as security. The Court upheld the Act stating:
"Respondents advance the argument that this
act is a loan of credit forbidden by Article VI,
Section 31, of the Utah Constitution. With this
we cannot agree. See: State ex rei. Nielson et al.
v. Lindstrom, Idaho 1948, 191 P. 2d 1009; City
and County of San Francisco v. Collins, 216 Cat
187, 13 P. 2d 912; Bowman v. Frost 1942, 289 Ky.
826, 158 S.W. 2d 945. The object to be realized
by the act is aid to needy persons over the age of
65 years, and the lien provision provides a means
to equalize that aid in the best possible manner.
If money can be given to the aged in the interest of
public welfare, it is hard to see how doing less
than that-loaning it to them, is bad. The purpose of the act is to uphold the State's moral obligation to look after its needy. This is its public
purpose. The following quotation from 21 R.C.L.
701, quoted with approval in Bowman v. Frost,
supra, is illustrative of this moral obligation and
public duty:
"'The care of the state for its dependent classes
is considered by all enlightened people as a measure of its civilization, and the care of the poor is
generally recognized as among the unquestioned
object of public duty, but in spite of this, the duty
under the common law was purely moral and not
legal. There is therefore no legal obligation at
common law on any of the instrumentalities of
government to furnish relief to paupers. The obligation to support such persons results only from
statute . ... ' " (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, the obligation of the State to assume utility relocation costs results only from statute. If the State
may by statute assume financial burdens which at common law it was not obliged to assume, then certainly it
may recognize and alleviate burdens cast upon utilities
by the common ·law.
49
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In Barlow v. Clearfield City Corporation, 1 U. 2d
419, 268 P. 2d 682, this Court upheld a contract between
a municipality and a water conservancy district where
the city was obligated to take, or failing to take, nevertheless pay for certain quantities of water. The Court
held the contract was not a loan of the city's credit to the
district.
If the State or its agencies and instrumentalities
can give or loan money to indigents and contract its
credit for water, it does so because it is for public purpose. Such a function embraces expenditures made for
those activities of government in which the State has a
legitimate interest.
The cases from other jurisdictions holding that
reimbursement of relocation expenses is a proper governmental expenditure present the most persuasive authority that the standards set out in the Utah case are met.
It appears well settled in Utah that if the Legislature adopts legislation in furtherance of a public purpose and exercises a governmental function tending to
promote the public welfare, then such legislation is not
in conflict with Article VI, Section 31. Thomas v. Daughters of Utah Pioneers, 114 U. 108, 197 P. 2d 477. The
legislature, in adopting Chapter 53, exercised its inherent and constitutional powers to determine how the
burdens imposed by the expanding highway program
should be distributed. When the state, through its State
Road Commission engages in the construction, maintenance and repair of highways it exercises a public governmental function and the legislature has now determined that utility relocation expense is a proper expenditure in connection with this activity of the state.
50

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IV.
REIMBURSEMENT BY THE STATE TO PUBLICLY, PRIVATELY AND COOPERATIVELY
OWNED UTILITIES, INCLUDING DRAINAGE AND IRRIGATION SYSTEMS AND
UTILITIES OWNED BY ALL POLITICAL
SUBDIVISIONS FOR RELOCATION OF FACILITIES AS AUTHORZED BY CHAPTER
53, LAWS OF UTAH 1957, DOES NOT RELEASE OR EXTINGUISH AN INDEBTEDNESS, LIABILITY OR OBLIGATION IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 27 OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.
The Appellant has alleged in its Brief that Chapter
53 is repugnant to Article VI, Section 27, of the Utah
Constitution which provides that:
"The Legislature shall have no power to release
or extinguish, in whole or in part, the indebtedness, liability or obligation of any corporation or
person to the state, or to any municipal corporation therein."
However, Appellant has failed to cite any legal
authority or decision of any Court which would substantiate its position. Therefore, we submit that inasmuch
as "every presumption must be indulged in favor of the
constitutionality of an act, and every reasonable doubt
resolved in favor of its validity" that the Appellant has
failed to sustain the burden which "lies on him who denies
the constitutionality of a legislative enactment" Thomas
v. Daughters of Utah Pioneers, supra.
Even though Appellant has failed to discuss this
provision of the Constitution, we nevertheless shall
51
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affirmatively show that Chapter 53 does not violate
Article VI, Section 27.
Any argument based on the aforementioned provision of the Constitution must, we assume, rest on the
proposition that when the utility facilities of the Respondents were placed on the streets and roads, an obligation
to remove arose which became fixed and certain and
thereafter the Legislature had no authority to change the
law for the future.
Implicit in the argument is the proposition that
whatever duty rested upon the utility to relocate at its
own expense under the common law was such a responsibility or duty which constituted an obligation, indebtedness or liability within the meaning of Article VI, Section
27.
Examination of this duty or responsibility and its
comparison with obligations and liabilities which have,
by decision, been held as within and without the constitutional ban under this type of provision proves the assumption false and unwarranted. First, the duty to
relocate at the utility's expense under the common law
was a contingent one. The duty and responsibility arose
when and if the existing utility facilities interferred
with the rearrangement of a highway and, further, when
and if notice was given by the State to the utility to move.
Second, it cannot be reasonably or logically contended that the duty under the common law created any
fixed or certain money obligation to the State. Viewing
the duty or responsibility most rigidly it is, at best, a
contingent duty not consisting, nor with the possibility
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of ever consisting, of a definite fixed money obligation
of which the State could ever become the beneficiary.
This constitutional provision has no application
whatever to liabilities, indebtedness or obligations which
are in any way contingent, inchoate or not due and owing
until some future time.
A principle which seems to permeate all decisions
construing constitutional provisions identical or similar
to Article VI, Section 27, is that such constitutional provisions apply only to fixed and liquidated claims owing
the State or municipal corporations. Indeed, constitutional provisions of this character are applicable only to
taxes and other monetary obligations owed to the State.
State v. Montoya, 255 Pac. 634 ( N .M.) ; State ex rel.
Tharel v. Board of Commissioners of Creek County,
107 P. 2d 542 (Okla.).
An examination of the various cases decided by the
Utah Supreme Court relating to Article VI, Section 27,
fails to disclose any case in point. The only type of cases
that have been before the Utah Supreme Court have involved contractual or tax liabilities where the obligation,
if any, was susceptible of being discharged by the payment of money. City of St. George v. Public Utility Commission, 62 U. 453, 220 Pac. 720; Chez v. Indus1trial Commission of Utah, 90 U. 447, 62 P. 2d 549; In re Ingraham's Estate. Petersen v. State Tax Commission, 106 U.
337, 148 P. 2d 340; Odgen City v. Public Service Commission, 123 U. 427, 260 P. 2d 751.
In the very recent case of State of Texas v. City of
Dallas, et al., supra, the Court held that the Relocation
Law was not "a release of the obligations of corporations
and individuals" and said:
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"Although petitioner argues otherwise, it cannot be said that respondents are under an absolute and continuing legal obligation to relocate
at their own expense any utility installments
owned by them and situated in public ways whenever such relocation is made necessary by highway improvements. Their use of streets and highways for this purpose is simply subject at all
times to a valid exercise of the police power of the
state. It is only when the full measure of that
power is exerted that they are obligated to make
the installations conform to highway improvements at their own expense. This duty would
arise upon, and not before, the making of a lawful demand for relocation of the facilities. Here
the Legislature has empowered the State Highway Commission to construct interstate and defense highways and to direct municipalities and
utility companies to relocate their facilities.
That grant of authority is conditioned, however,
by the requirement that the utilities be reimbursed for the expense which they incur. In our
opinion this does not constitute the release of an
obligation to the state within the meaning of
Article III, Section 55 of the Constitution."
The Montana Constitution, Article V, Section 39, is
substantially the same as Article VI, Section 27, of the
Utah Constitution. In determining whether the Montana Relocation Law was in contravention of the Montana Constitution, the District Judge in the case of V. L.
(Pat) Jones v. Harry L. Burns, et al. said:
"Also this opinion has heretofore held that even
though the liabilities or obligations for relocation
were assumed by the utilities under their permit
from the Highway Commission, the Legislature
was within its constitutional authority to amend
this agreement to provide for these payments of
relocation costs.
"Therefore, this Court holds that Article V,
54
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Section 39 of the Montana Constitution has no
application to Chapter 254, and that the passage
of said law was not in violation of said constitutional provision."
For other cases construing similar constitutional
provisions, which decisions support our position herein,
see Louisville Home Telephone Company v. City of Lotdsville, 113 S.W. 855; Cole v. Burton, 232 S.W. 2d 838;
Roberts v. The Fiscal Court, 51 S.W. 2d 897; State v.
Sparks, 253 P. 2d 1070.
A most persuasive precedent is State v. Chariton
Drainage District No. 1, 158 S.W. 633 (Mo.). This case
concerned a Missouri Act under which drainage companies were empowered to cut their ditches through highway rights of way and a duty was placed upon the counties to build and construct bridges over such ditches at
the expense of the counties. Prior to the adoption of the
statute, the drainage companies had to bear the expense.
An attack was made on the statute upon the ground
that it released or remitted a liability in contravention
of Article IV, Section 51 of the Missouri Constitution,
which is similar to Article VI, Section 27. This attack
was based on the fact that the drainage company, absent
the legislation placing the burden of the expense of building bridges over the company's ditches on the counties,
was under an obligation or liability to build the bridges
at its own expense and that this burden having been
shifted to the county was a release or remittance prohibited by the Constitution. In disposing of this contention and sustaining the constitutionality of the statute,
the Court said :
"The second contention is: That such construe55
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tion by this court would violate section 51 of
article 4 of the Constitution, which prohibits the
Legislature from releasing, extinguishing, or
authorizing the releasing or extinguishing, in
whole or in part, the indebtedness, liability, or
obligation of any corporation or individual in this
state, etc.
"Counsel have clearly misconceived the meaning and purpose of this constitutional provision.
It is self-evident that before that provision can
have any application or can be called into operation, it must first be established that said corporation or individual is liable or indebted to some
one, and that the act of the Legislature undertakes
to release that liability or indebtedness; but in
the case at bar no liability or indebtedness exists
on the part of the defendant corporation to Macon
county, nor does article 1 of chapter 41, R. S.
1909, undertake or attempt to release any such
obligation." ( 158 S.W. at 639)
The Chariton case clearly holds that the shifting of
this burden to the county by the statute was not a remittance or a release of liability within the meaning of the
constitutional provision. This case presents the strongest
parallel possible to the case before this Court, in connection with a constitutional provision touching the release
of obligations and liabilities ·and we submit that it is
decisive on the issue raised herein by Appellant.
We respectfully submit that Chapter 53, Laws of
Utah 1957, does not violate Article VI, Section 27, and
that the Legislature could- constitutionally change the
burden of utility relocation in connection with relocations
occurring after the passage of said Act.

56
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of
the lower court, holding and finding that Chapter 53,
Laws of Utah 1957 is constitutional, be affirmed and that
the Appellant is obligated thereby to reimburse Respondents for their relocation expenses.
Respectfully submitted,
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IN THE SUPREME COURT

o~F

TEXAS

NO. A-7173
The State of Texas,

v.

Petitioner,

City of Austin, et al,
Respondents.

Third District

NO. A-7174
The State of Texas,

v.

From Travis County

Petitioner,

City of Dallas, et al,
Respondents ..
These declaratory judgment actions place in issue
the constitutionality of Article 6674w-4, Vernon's Ann.
Tex. Civ. Stat., which was enacted by the Legislature
in 1957 as part of House Bill 179. Acts 1957, 55th Leg.,
p. 724, ch. 300, § 4A. The statute provides that the relocation of utility facilities necessitated by the improvement of highways established as part of the National
System of Interstate and Defense Highways shall be
made by the utility at the cost and expense of the state
provided such relocation is eligible for Federal participation. It evidently was adopted for the purpose of
securing the benefits of the Federal-Aid Highway Act
of 1956, which authorizes the use of Federal funds to
reimburse the state for the cost of relocating utility
facilities in the same proportion as such funds are expended on a given project, with the proviso that Federal
money shall not be used for that purpose when payment
i
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to the utility violates either state law or a legal contract between the utility and the state. See 23 U.S. C. A.
§ 123.
The two suits, which have been consolidated for submission on appeal, were instituted by the Attorney General in the name of the State of Texas, petitioner, one
against the City of Dallas, Southwestern Bell Telephone
Company, Dallas Power & Light Company, and Lone
Star Gas Company, respondents, and the other against the
City of Austin, Southwestern Bell Telephone Company,
and Southern Union Gas Company, respondents. These
municipalities and companies have various utility facilities located within the rights of way of city streets,
alleys and other public places in the corporate limits of
Austin and Dallas, and it will be necessary to relocate
the same in connection with the improvement and construction of designated interstate high,vays. Respondents
have taken the position that they are entitled to be reimbursed for the cost of doing this as provided in Article
6674w-4, while petitioner insists that the statute is unconstitutional. The law was upheld by the trial court,
and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. 319 S. W. 2d
767. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Civil
Appeals.
Petitioner's first four points of error in this Court
assert that Article 6674w-4, to the extent that it authorizes the use of public funds to pay part of the cost of relocating utility facilities now situated .in public ways
and owned either by a municipality in its proprietary
capacity or by a utility company, contravenes the Texas
Constitution in that such payment would constitute: (1)
a grant of public moneys to corporations and individuals
ii
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in violation of Article III, Section 51; ( 2) a gift or loan
of the credit of the state in violation of Article III, Section
50; ( 3) a release of the obligations of corporations and
individuals in violation of Article III, Section 55; and
(4) an appropriation for private or individual purposes in violation of Article XVI, Section 6. These four
points are closely related and have been grouped by
petitioner for purposes of argument.
In the absence of assumption by the state of part
of the expense, it is clear that respondents could be required to remove at their own expense any installations
owned by them and located in public rights of way whenever such relocation is made necessary by highway improvements. See City of San Antonio v. Bexar Metropolitan Water District, Tex. Civ. App., 309 S. W. 2d 491
(wr. ref.) ; City of San Antonio v. San Antonio St. Ry.
Co., Tex. Civ. App., 39 S. W. 136 ( wr. ref.) ; State of
Tennessee v. United Stat-es, 6th Cir., 256 F. 2d 244. As
pointed out in the Bexar Metropolitan Water District
case, the main purposes of roads and streets are for
travel and transportation. While public utilities may
use the same for laying their lines, such use is subject to
reasonable regulation by either the state, the county or
the city, as the case may be. The utility may always
be required, in the valid exercise of the police power by
proper governmental authority, to remove or adjust its
installations to meet the needs of the public for travel
and transportation.
There is no material difference in this respect between a utility company and a municipal corporation.
For many years the cities and towns of Texas have enjoyed exclusive dominion and control over the streets,
iii
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alleys and other public places within their respective
corporate limits, but this was pursuant to a statutory
delegation of authority. See Articles 1016, 1146 and
1175, Vernon's Ann. Tex. Civ. Stat. The Legislature
acting for the state has primary and plenary power to
control and regulate public roads and streets. It may
delegate that power to counties or municipal corporations, but such a grant of authority may be revoked or
modified at any time. See Robbins v. Limestone County,
114 Tex. 345, 268 S.W. 915; West v. City of Waco, 116
Tex. 472, 294 S.W. 832; 64 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations
§§ 1686, 1689. The statutory power of cities and towns
over public ways within their corporate limits has now
been abridged by Sections 2 and 5 of House Bill 179. See
Articles 6674w-l and 6674w-5, Vernon's Ann. Tex. Civ.
Stat. It is there provided that the State Highway Commission shall have the power to construct, maintain and
operate designated state highways in any area of the
state, whether in or outside the limits of any municipal
corporation, and that the exercise of such power shall
qualify and render inconclusive the dominion of any city
or town with respect to the specific streets, alleys or
other public ways affected thereby.
The Legislature, if it had decided to do so, could
also have provided that any utility facilities standing in
the way must be moved at the owner's cost. Respondents
recognize that such a requirement would be valid and
enforceable. Many city ordinances as well as several of
our statutes authorizing utility companies and municipal
corporations to erect their lines along and upon public
roads and streets stipulate that the owner of the facility
may be required to relocate the same at its own expense
so as. to permit road and street improvements. See
iv
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Articles 1433, 1433a, 1436a, and 1436b, Vernon's Ann.
Tex. Civ. Stat. These statutes and ordinances express
the public policy of the state as it existed at the time of
their adoption. Subject to constitutional limitations,
however, that policy may be changed by the Legislature
at any time. See McCain v. Yost, 155 Tex. 174,284 S.W.
2d 898; Scarborough v. Payne, Tex. Civ. App., 198 S.W.
2d 917 (wr. ref. ) .
After the occurrence of events which under the law
then existing give rise to an obligation on the part of an
individual or corporation to the state, the Legislature has
no power to release or diminish that obligation without
consideration. Empire Gas & Fuel Co. v. State, 121 Tex.
138, 47 S.W. 2d 265. See also Delta County v. Blackburn,
100 Tex. 51, 93 S.W. 419. Moreover, the us.e of public
money to pay a claim predicated on facts which generate
no state liability constitutes a gift or donation in violation of our Constitution. See Tompkins v. Williams, Com.
App., 62 S.W. 2d 70. Respondents could not, therefore,
be reimbursed for all or any part of the expense incurred
by them in relocating their lines prior to the adoption
of House Bill 179. But the statute does not operate retrospectively, and respondents claim no right to reimbursement for costs incurred before it became effective.
Although petitioner argues otherwise, it cannot be
said that respondents are under an absolute and continuing legal obligation to relocate at their own expense any
utility installments owned by them and situated in public
ways whenever such relocation is made necessary by
highway improvements. Their use of streets and highways for this purpose is simply subject at all times to a
valid exercise of the police power of the state. It is only
v
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when the full measure of that power is exerted that they
are obligated to make the installations conform to highway improvements at their own expense. This duty would
arise upon, and not before, the making of a lawful demand for relocation of the facilities. Here the Legislature has empowered the State Highway Commission to
construct interstate and defense highways and to direct
municipalities and utility companies to relocate their
facilities. That grant of authority is conditioned, however, by the requirement that the utilities be reimbursed
for the expense which they incur. In our opinion this
does not constitute the release of an obligation to the state
within the meaning of Article III, Section 55 of the Constitution. See State v. Chariton Drainage District No. 1,
252 Mo. 345, 158 S.W. 633.
Article 6674w-4 obviously does not involve a gift
or loan of the credit of the state unless it can be said that
payment of relocation costs amounts to a grant of public
money in violation of Article III, Section 51. The purpose of this section and of Article XVI, Section 6, of the
Constitution is to prevent the application of public funds
to private purposes; in other words, to prevent the gratuitous grant of such funds to any individual or corporation whatsoever. See Byrd v. City of Dallas, 118 Tex.
28, 6 S.W. 2d 738. Statutes analogous to House Bill179
have been upheld against this or similar constitutional
attacks by the appellate courts of at least five other jurisdictions. Minneapolis Gas Co. v. Zimmerman, ______ Minn.
______ , 91 N.W. 2d 642; Opinion of the Justices, ______ N.H.
______ , 132 A. 2d 613; Opinion of the Justices, ______ Me. ______ ,
132 A. 2d 440; Department of Highways v. Pennsylvania
Public Utility Commission, 185 Pa. Super. 1, 136 A. 2d
473 (reversed on other grounds, 394 Pa. 31, 145 A. 2d
vi
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

538); Oswego & S.R. Co. v. State, 226 N.Y. 351, 124
N.E. 8. See also Delaware River Port Authority v.
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 393 Pa. 639,
145 A. 2d 172. On the other hand, the Tennessee statute
was struck down by a closely divided court on the ground
that the expenditure authorized thereby is not for a
public purpose, State v. Southern Bell Telephone and
Telegraph Co., ______ Tenn. ______ , 319 S.W. 2d 90, and the
same conclusion was reached by the Supreme Court of
New Mexico. State Highway Commission v. Southern
Union Gas Co., 65 N.M. 84, 332 P. 2d 1007. See also
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Commonwealth, _____ _
Ky. ______ , 266 S.W. 2d 308; Mulkey v. Quillian, 213 Ga.
507, 100 S.E. 2d 268.
In considering this question, it should be noted that
no net gain accrues to the utility from the relocation of
its facilities in the manner and under the conditions prescribed by the statute. "Cost of relocation" is defined
as including the entire amount paid by the utility properly attributable to such relocation after deducting any
increase in value of the new facility and any salvage
value derived from the old facility. As pointed out by
the Supreme Court of Minnesota, the reimbursement
merely restores the utilities to the position in which they
were prior to the relocation of their facilities. Minneapolis Gas Co. v. Zimmerman, supra. It also is clear
that if not reimbursed for their non-betterment costs,
respondents will be subjected to substantial expense as
a direct result of the highway improvement program.
Respondents benefit from the statute only in the
sense that they are relieved of a financial burden which
they could be required to bear. The question to be devii
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cided then is whether the use of public funds to pay part
or all of the loss or expense to which an individual or
corporation is subjected by the state in the exercise of
its police power is an unconstitutional donation for a
private purpose. We think not provided the statute
creating the right of reimbursement operates prospectively, deals with the matter in which the public has a
real and legitimate interest, and is not fraudulent, arbitrary or capricious.
This question has not arisen frequently, because it
is rather unusual for a legislative body to ameliorate an
exercise of the police power. In most cases the courts
are concerned only with whether the lawmakers have
gone beyond the extreme limits of such power. When
that is the issue, the judgment of the Legislature is supreme provided there is any reasonable basis for the
action taken. It has often been said that the lawmakers
have considerable discretion in determining not only
what the interests of the public require but also what
measures are necessary for the protection of those interests. If there is room for a fair difference of opinion
as to the necessity for and reasonableness of an enactment which lies within the domain of the police power,
the courts will not hold it void. See City of Bellaire v.
Lamkin, ______ Tex. ______ , 317 S.W. 2d 43.
Compensation is not required to be made for damage
or loss resulting from a valid exercise of the police power.
See State v. Richards, 157 Tex. 166, 301 S.W. 2d 597, and
authorities there cited. The absence of a cause of action
does not, however, reduce the loss which individuals are
often required to bear or make their injuries any less
real. When the benefits to be gained by the public are
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not commensurate with the burdens imposed upon private
persons, the law will not be permitted to stand. See
Houston & T.C. Ry. Co. v. City of Dallas, 98 Tex. 396,
84 S.W. 648, 70 L.R.A. 850; Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.
Co. v. Rockwall County L. I. Dist. No. 3, 117 Tex. 34,
297 S.W. 206. Individual hardship is thus to be weighed
by the courts against the public advantages of a measure
in determining whether the statute is a valid exercise
of the police power. These factors are also to be considered by the Legislature in making its determination
as to the manner in which such power may and should
be exercised. It would be quite strange then to say that
the lawmakers have no choice except to act not at all
when they conclude that a particular measure is essential to the public welfare but will be unduly burdensome to private citizens. If they decide to reimburse the
latter for part or all of their actual loss or expense, the
payment is not transformed into a mere gratuity simply
because it may appear to the courts that the Legislature
has not exerted the full measure of its power. Our fundamental law does not contemplate or require that every
private injury and loss which may be necessary to protect
or promote the public health, safety, comfort and convenience must always be borne by individuals and corporations.
If the statute involved in the Richards case had provided that the innocent owner might recover the value
of his vehicle from the state, we certainly would not say
that the payment amounted to a mere gratuity. Animals
and buildings may be destroyed without compensation to
the owner where such action is necessary to prevent the
spread of disease or fire, but legislation authorizing such
destruction upon condition that the owner is paid the

.
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value of his property does not contravene Article III,
Sections 51 and 52 of our Constitution. Chambers v.
Gilbert Tex. Civ. App., 42 S.W. 630 (wr. ref.). More
nearly like the question involved in the present case was
the one considered in City of Beaumont v. Priddie, Tex.
Civ. App., 65 S.W. 2d 434 (judgments of lower courts
reversed and cause dismissed for mootness, Texas &
N. 0. R. Co. v. Priddie, 127 Tex. 629, 95 S.W. 2d 1290),
which involved the validity of a contract whereby the
city agreed to pay part of the expense incurred by a railroad in constructing underpasses where its tracks
crossed public streets at grade. The judgment of the
trial court enjoining the city from carrying out the
agreement was affirmed on grounds which are not material here. It was also contended by the appellees that
the city's contribution to the cost of construction came
within the inhibition of Article XI, Section 3, of the
Constitution, which prohibits a municipal corporation
from making any appropriation or donation to a private
corporation. In disposing of this question, the Court of
Civil Appeals at Austin, speaking through Chief Justice
McClendon, said :
"But, although the state may compel the railroad to bear the entire expense of grade separation, nevertheless it is not required to do so, but
may bear the entire expense itself, or apportion it
between itself and the railroad. While this power
is generally recognized, the cases in which it has
been challenged as violative of constitutional provisions similar to those in this state inhibiting the
state or its subdivisions from making donations
to private corporations or individuals appear to
be rare. Those in which the question has been considered uniformly hold that state or municipal
contribution to the expense does not come \vithin
such inhibition. Lehigh Valley Ry. v. Canal
X
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Board, 204 N.Y. 471, 97 N.E. 964, Ann. Cas.
1913C, 1228; Brooke v. Philadelphia, 162 Pa. 123,
29 A. 387, 24 L. R. A. 781. We think the soundness of this holding cannot seriously be questioned.
While the paramount duty rests upon the railroad
to provide originally and thereafter to maintain
the safety of the crossing, regardless of the requirements in that regard brought about by
changes in conditions, still the interest therein of
the state as representative of the public is such
that the expenditure of public funds. in this regard is a legitimate governmental function, and
does not properly fall within the designation of a
donation of public funds to a private enterprise.
In the infinite variety of situations which present
themselves, the state may properly make an adjustment of the expense, as the peculiar equities
of each situation may in its judgment dictate. In
this matter the judgment of the state is supreme,
subject to judicial review only in case of fraudulent or arbitrary abuse of the power."
·It is important to remember that utility facilities
are not placed in public streets. merely for the convenience
of private stockholders. As stated in Jones v. Carter,
Tex. Civ. App., 101 S.W. 514 (wr. ref.), "light, sewers,
gas and water works are among the common necessities
of modern cities, and it is a matter of common knowledge
that such plants cannot be constructed and operated without running the lines and mains along or across the
streets. They are some of the common uses to which
streets are necessarily devoted." It is the interest of the
public in receiving utility services which supports the
right of utilities to use streets and highways for that
purpose in the first place. See State v. Southwestern Bell
Telephone Co., 338 Mo. 617, 92 S.W. 2d 612.
Highway construction is clearly a governmental
xi

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

purpose for which public funds may properly be expended. See Texas Constitution, Article XVI, Section 24;
Robbins v. Limestone County, supra. The removal of
utility facilities which stand in the way is as necessary
to the accomplishment of that purpose as the removal
of trees and hills. Unlike trees and hills, however, the
utility lines must be moved and restored at another
location if the people are to receive services that are
essential to the protection of their health and safety.
The public thus has a direct and immediate interest in
the relocation of utility facilities which would otherwise
interfere with highway improvements, and payment of
the non-betterment cost thereof does not constitute a
donation of public funds or an appropriation for a private purpose. As pointed out in Wilson v. City of Long
Branch, 27 N.J. 360, 142 A. 2d 837, "Utilities are necessary adjuncts of the public welfare. Their business
~perations and their property have been subject to special
legislative treatment for many years. * * In the present
context, uninterrupted service during and after the
completion of the * * project is vital. Where removal
of facilities is necessary, it is important that relocation
be as expeditious and controversy-free as possible. That
end is intimately related to the achievement of the overall public purpose * *."
If the non-betterment cost of doing this is not paid
by the state, the same must be borne· initially by the
utilities. In most instances the burden would ultimately
fall upon local tax payers and rate payers, who must
also provide part of the taxes used for highway construction. These individuals, who receive no special benefit
from the highways, would thus be required to contribute
twice to the overall cost of the undertaking. Under these
xii
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circumstances, it was for the Legislature to determine
whether to equalize the burden by paying the entire
expense from state funds. In the words of Mr. Justice
Cardozo, "this is a case where the Legislature, by action
looking to the future, has defined the terms of equity and
justice upon which it will go into an enterprise. In
fixing these conditions, the Legislature has a wide discretion. * * Courts will not revise its judgment unless
there has been manifest abuse. * * The state was about
to execute a great public work. It saw that in the doing
of that work there would be destruction of private property. Much of the damage would be damnum absque
injuria. Nonetheless it would be damage. The result
would be inequality in the distribution of public burdens.
Some vvould pay more dearly than others in proportion
to benefits received. This inequality the Legislature,
fixing in advance the conditions of the undertaking, had
the power to correct. It might refuse to launch an enterprise at the price of hardship and oppression. There was
power to destroy and leave the loss where it might fall.
There was also power to pay for the destruction, and
thereby reestablish some uniformity of proportion between benefits and burdens. The question was for the
Legislature whether the equity of compensation was
strong enough to merit recognition. We cannot hold it
to be illusory." Oswego & S. R. Co. v. State, supra. 1
In our opinion, Article 6674w-4 is a reasonable exercise
by the state of its power to assume the financial burdens

1 In citing and quoting from this case, we are not to be understood as
approving the New York rule that the legislature may recognize claims
founded on equity and justice even though the same could not have been
enforced in a court of law if the state were subject to suit. See Lehigh Valley
R. Co. v. Canal Board, 204 N.Y. 471, 97 N.E. 964.
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of public improvements, and does not violate any of the
constitutional provisions mentioned above.
The statute does not grant an irrevocable or uncontrollable special privilege, because the law can be repealed
at any time and in that event there will be no right to
reimbursement for relocation expenses thereafter incurred. It should be noted, however, that if the relocated
lines are placed on right of way owned by the utility,
the cost of acquiring said right of way is not properly
attrfbutable to such relocation within the meaning of the
Act. If the .state should pay this cost, it would be in the
position of buying for the utility that which it would be
required to take under the power of eminent domain in
the event the land where the relocated lines are placed
were ever needed for a different and superior public use.
This would be an unconstitutional gift for a private purpose, and the statute should, if reasonably possible, be
_given a construction that will not render it invalid.
County of Cameron v. Wilson, -~---- Tex. ______ , 326 S.W. 2d
162.
By the terms of Article 6674w-4, reimbursement
for relocation costs is conditioned upon the eligibility
of such relocation for Federal participation. Petitioner
argues that a change in the conditions and extent of Feder~l participation would modify the legal obligation of
the State of Texas to utility owners, both private and
municipal, and that the statute is therefore an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the United
States, its Congress and agencies. Respondents insist
that the statute is merely contingent legislation similar
to that which was considered in The Brig Aurora, 11 U.S.
( 7 Cranch) 382, and City of San Antonio v. Jones, 28
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Tex. 19. We do not agree with either of these contentions.
The law was complete when it left the hands of the
Legislature and was not to become operative upon the
happening of some contingency or future event. A change
in the percentage of Federal participation will naturally affect the amount which the state receives by way
of reimbursement, but will not alter in any way the
obligation of the state to the utilities. No part of the
expense will be paid by the state, of course, if the relocation is not eligible for Federal participation, but in making this provision the Legislature was simply establishing a class of relocation projects for. which the utilities
will be entitled to reimbursement. It is our opinion that.
the classification is reasonable and that the law is not
unconstitutional as a delegation of legislative power.
The cost of relocation is to be paid out of the State
Highway F·und, which is derived, in part, from motor
vehicle registration fees and motor fuel taxes. See
Articles 6675a-10, 6694, and 7065b-25, Vernon's Ann.
Tex. Civ. Stat. Under the provisions of Article VIII,
Section 7a, of the Constitution, revenues received from
these sources may be used only for constructing public
roadways and for other designated purposes which are
not material here. Petitioner argues that utility relocation expense is not part of the cost of highway-construction ·within the meaning of this provision. The courts·
of other jurisdictions are rather evenly divided on that
question. Two have expressed the view that costs of
relocation cannot be paid with funds. that are authorized
to be used for highway construction. Opinion of the
Justices, ______ Me. ______ , 132 A. 2d 440; Mulkey v. Quillian,
XV
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supra. An equal number have held that the language of
the Constitution should not be given such a narrow construction. Minneapolis Gas Co. v. Zimmerman, supra;
Opinion of the Justices, ______ N.H. ______ , 132 A. 2d 613.
It seems to us that the latter conclusion is sound in principle and supported by the better reasoning. Article
VIII, Section 7a, does not define or restrict the meaning
of "constructing" in any way. The term obviously does
not embrace merely the ·clearing and grading of the roadbed and the pouring of concrete, but includes "everything
appropriately connected with, and necessarily incidental
to, the complete accomplishment of the general purpose
for which the fund exists." See 40 C.J.S. Highways
§ 176 h (2) (a). In Bell County v. Lightfoot, 104 Tex. 346,
138 S.W. 381, it was held that the power given a governmental agency to issue bonds· for constructing a public
improvement carried with it the further authority to
obtain funds in that manner for repairing and maintain•
ing the completed improvement.
The constitutionality of a statute must be sustained
by the courts unless its invalidity is apparent beyond a
reasonable doubt. See Trapp v. Shell Oil Co., 145 Tex.
323, 198 S.W. 2d 424. It has already been pointed out
that the use of public ways for the installation of utility
lines and mains is one of the proper and common purposes·
to· which roads and streets are necessarily devoted, although their principal and primary use is for travel and
transportation. The relocation of such facilities is made
necessary by and is an integral part of the highway improvement program. If the Legislature determines, as
it has in this instance, .that the non-betterment cost
xvi
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thereof should be paid by the state, it is our opinion that
the same is properly attributable to highway construction within the meaning of the Constitution.
The judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals is
affirmed.

Ruel C. Walker
Associate Justice
RCW/fa
Opinion Delivered:

Jan. 6, 1960
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